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• This report is the first attempt of which we are aware to generate a comparative 
assessment of the costs of ‘too much finance’ for particular individual 
countries, arriving at a total price tag for the United States and United Kingdom 
from the 1990s to the current period. 
• The report builds on existing peer reviewed econometric studies on the growth 
costs associated with “too much inance” applying general estimates in this literature 
to speciic countries.
• Our calculations suggest that the total cost of lost growth potential for the UK caused 
by ‘too much inance’ between 1995 and 2015 is in the region of £4,500 billion. 
This total figure amounts to roughly 2.5 years of the average GDP across the 
period.
• If we add an additional category of excess rent to these calculations as a wider 
distributional cost with potential negative social implications, the costs rise to £5,180 
billion, or 3 years of GDP averaged across the 20 year period.
• The data reports a much more pronounced efect than the earlier application of this 
method to the United States (Epstein and Montecino, 2016), which identiied costs 
of $22,300 billion between 1990 and 2023, or slightly more than one year’s worth of 
2018 US GDP. 
• This data suggests the negative costs of too much inance might be two to three 
times higher for the UK than for the US. This in turn requires further research to 
verify these costs and the processes through which they occur. 
• We present these igures on the basis of the construction of a counterfactual growth 
path derived from the too much inance data sets that identiies an optimum inancial 
sector size. 
• The costs we report are those over and above those levied if the financial system 
were operating at a more efficient and optimum level.
• The data suggests that the UK economy, may have performed much better in overall 
growth terms if: (a) its financial sector was smaller; (b) if finance was more 
focused on supporting other areas of the economy, rather than trying to act as a 
source of wealth generation (extraction) in its own right.
• This evidence also provides support for the idea that the UK sufers from a form 
of ‘finance curse’: a development trajectory of inancial overdependence involving 
a crowding out of other sectors and a skewing of social relations, geography and 
politics.
• A focused and systematic interdisciplinary research agenda using the inance curse 
framing, could help to further dig behind the numbers presented here and deepen 
our understandings and implications of the ‘too much inance’ phenomenon on a 
country by country basis.
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• The most striking component of the initial estimations are UK misallocation costs 
at £2,700 billion over the period, or 147.4 per cent of 2015 UK GDP. 
• The results reveal that misallocation efects are much larger in the UK than in the US, 
accounting for between 52.1% and 60% of total UK costs, as opposed to between 
17.48% and 20.5 % of total US costs. Further investigation into these seemingly 
large UK misallocation costs is very much required.
• We propose a framework for further excavating and disaggregating the black box of 
misallocation that draws on ‘inance curse’ ideas and recognises that misallocation can 
take at least three forms: 1) Harmful financial agency (conscious intentional inancial 
allocation decisions that result in short termism and rent extraction); 2) Structural 
gravitational pull (largely unintentional brain drain and rent attraction caused by the 
presence of an extensive inancial infrastructure); 3) Unintended distortionary price 
spillovers (Dutch disease – exchange rate and property price inlation that impedes 
alternative tradable sectors and exports).
• The indings and ideas we present here should mark the start of a process of more 
carefully debating and considering the potential social and economic costs of 
excessive inance in the UK and should be of both interest to researchers and of 
concern to policy makers. 
• The indings also point to a need to change the terms of the public conversation about 
inance in the UK, involving a recognition that where inance is concerned more can 
sometimes be less, and less could be more? 
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Can societies be harmed by hosting too much inancial activity? This big question hangs 
over ten years on from the 2008 inancial crisis. A strand of econometric research 
known as the ‘too much inance thesis’ does provide some evidence to support such 
a proposition. This thesis holds that inance starts to retard an economy and its 
performance once it goes beyond a certain size, usually a turning point of around 90% 
of GDP (Arcand, et al, 2015, Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015, 2012, Epstein and Montecino, 
2016, Philippon, 20151). Another formulation and possible explanation for these indings 
goes further in suggesting countries with large active inancial sectors sufer from a 
inance curse efect (Christensen and Shaxson, 2013, Christensen, Shaxson and Wigan, 
2016). This purported inance curse efect has a number of parallels with the infamous 
resource curse identiied by development political economists, which blights some 
developing countries with plentiful natural resources (Karl, 1997, Ross, 1999). The inance 
curse identiies a crowding out dynamic, where a large active inancial sector assumes 
priority in economic life, damaging other sectors, harming productivity and causing 
poor macroeconomic performance, while also spilling over to shape the social, political, 
cultural and geographical wiring of afected countries. 
This research report takes two new steps to make two main points. First, the ‘too much 
inance’ literature has focused and relied on aggregate data sets across a range of 
countries. In this report, we present the irst eforts, of which we are of aware, to put a 
price tag on the total costs of ‘too much inance’ for individual countries on a comparative 
basis. We begin with an earlier study by Epstein and Montecino (2016) on the United 
States and apply their methodology to the United Kingdom. We present an estimation 
of the total cost of ‘too much inance’ for the UK between 1995-2015 of £5,180 billion (3 
years of average GDP during this period), or £4,500 billion, 2.5 years of GDP, when 
we exclude the category – ‘excess rent’ from the calculations. A similar method applied 
to the United States revealed inancial sector costs of $22,300 billion between 1990 and 
2023, which is slightly more than one year’s worth of 2018 GDP. The efect is therefore 
far larger for the UK and we provide some comparative discussion of the diferences. 
Second, the ‘too much inance’ literature and its econometric methods generate some 
very interesting indings, but the literature and the estimations reported here also raise 
many questions, as to the underlying processes and their veracity in the UK context, as 
well as their social welfare implications. In the second half of this report we present 
the ‘inance curse’ concept and framing as a means of digging behind the numbers. We 
suggest a focused and systematic interdisciplinary research agenda using the inance 
curse framing, can amplify and deepen our understandings and implications of the ‘too 
much inance’ phenomenon.
1 It is worth noting that the too much inance literature draws on earlier work (Minsky, 1974, Kindleberger, 1978, Easterly, 
Islam, and Stiglitz 2000), showing a convex and non-monotone relationship between inancial depth and the volatility of 
output growth. It builds on Tobin’s (1984) fears that the social returns of the inancial sector are lower than its private 
returns and that a large inancial sector may “steal” talents from productive sectors. 
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The major point to emerge from the ‘too much inance literature’ is that past a certain 
threshold inancial sector growth starts to harm economic performance and overall 
growth. Arcand et al, found that inance starts having a negative efect on output growth 
when credit to the private sector goes above 90% of GDP (in the UK in 2016 credit to 
private sector was 134% of GDP, but during 2008-11, was over 180% GDP). This ‘non-
monotone’ relationship between inancial depth and economic growth was found to be 
robust when controlling for macroeconomic volatility, banking crises, and institutional 
quality (Arcand et al, 2015). The former head of the Monetary and Economics Department 
at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), reported similar indings concluding that 
there is a point where more banking and credit results in lower growth, with excessive 
growth in the inancial system being particularly bad for employment, or value added 
real productivity growth, precisely because the inancial sector starts to compete with 
the rest of the economy for resources (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012). In later work, 
the same authors found that inancial growth, disproportionately harms research and 
development intensive industries, echoing earlier indings on the efects of shortening 
time horizons in the inancial industry by researchers at the Bank of England (Cecchetti 
and Kharroubi, 2015, Davies et al, 2014). However, to date we have little sense of how the 
efects reported in the ‘too much inance’ literature, reduce economic performance and 
growth in particular national contexts and to what extent over time. 
In earlier work, Epstein and Montecino set out to calculate the ‘excess costs’ the US 
inancial system imposed on the American economy and society, ‘over and above those 
charges and costs levied if the inancial system were operating at a more eicient and 
optimum level’ (Epstein and Montecino, 2016, p.2). They arrived at their estimation by 
looking at three components: i) rents or excess profits deined as excess incomes that 
operators and investors in the inancial sector receive over and above the incomes they 
would need in order to induce them to supply their inancial products or services in 
an eicient, competitive, capitalist economy (lower bound $3680.5 billion, upper bound 
$4,235.2 billion); ii) misallocation costs, - deined as the price of diverting resources 
away from non-inancial activities and into inance through lost productivity and lower 
investment of skills and capital in R&D intensive areas in particular ($2,568.5 billion lower 
bound, $3.981 billion upper bound); iii) costs of crisis and recession (of 2008) ($6556.5 
billion lower bound, $14,549.7 billion upper bound). Aggregating these costs together for 
the United States the overall cost was found to be in a range $12.905.6 billion to $22.765 
billion, between 1990-2023. This amounts to between 0.56 and 1.11 years worth of 2018 US 
GDP over that period. In what follows we follow a modiied version of this methodology 
to provide estimations of UK costs over a 20 year period from 1995 to 2015. 
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Table 1: US Costs 1990-2005 billions of 2014 US dollars (from Epstein and 
Montecino, 2016, p.27)
The costs documented above in table 1 for the United States are a combination of zero 
and negative sum costs. Excess rents and proits, the irst category, are zero sum re-
distributive costs. These costs represent a redistribution from the majority of members 
of society (90-99%), to a smaller group of inancial elites (1-10%), or the primary direct 
beneiciaries of excess proits and compensation in the inancial sector. In contrast, 
the other two categories, costs of crisis and misallocation are negative sum. Unlike 
excess rents, they shrink the overall size of the economy, though they too will have a 
distributive element, in terms of who bears the highest relative costs and losses. As with 
the original research for the United States we add together both zero and negative sum 
costs to provide a total igure for the UK. However, for the UK we also provide a figure 
for solely negative sum costs (misallocation + cost of crisis) and emphasise this 
lower number £4,500 billion, or approximately 2.5 years of GDP, (or 2 years of GDP, 
using the 2018 GDP igure). 
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The reason we emphasise the lower negative sum cost number for the UK, is the possibility 
that costs in the rent category (in the form of excess fees, proit and remuneration) 
are taken almost entirely from the rest of the world, rather than from the wider UK 
economy. This is a very generous assumption and such an absolute pattern is unlikely 
to exist in reality. Nevertheless to remove ambiguity, we remove the rent category from 
our headline UK igure, to provide what we consider to be a conservative estimation2. 
For this reason, we reverse the order employed for the United States calculations. For 
the UK, we start with misallocation, move on to costs of crisis, and report excess rents 
last. Table 2 below shows the cost of all 3 categories and replicates the US table in Table 
1. It is the middle two components misallocation costs and crisis costs that form our 
headline igure of £4,500 billion. The table shows were we to include the rent categories 
of excess compensation and excess proits the number would be higher still.
Table 2: Cumulative Financial Sector Costs United Kingdom (1995-2015)
Methodology
The ‘too much inance’ literature calculates negative sum costs using counterfactuals. For 
misallocation costs, we use the cross-country empirical analysis developed in the ‘too 
much inance’ literature. We construct a path, or trajectory the economy would follow if 
the inancial sector was optimal in terms of size and operation, derived from the data in 
this literature. We then efectively measure the gap between this hypothetical path in a 
given year, and the line or path actual GDP takes in that year, to arrive at aggregate igures 
of misallocation costs across the time period 1995-2015. Another hypothetical line would 
be the trajectory GDP would take if there were no inance. In this case, we would expect 
that line to be substantially lower than actual GDP, illustrating that inance aids growth 
up to a certain point, but starts to hamper economic performance when it goes past that 
point. We refer to the gap between actual GDP and the enhanced trajectory derived from 
the too much inance literature data as a net cost at the margin. In this respect, what 
we are measuring is the cost of having too “big a inancial sector” (due to misallocation) 
compared with having the “optimal” inancial sector, over a period of time. 
2 It could also be argued that the misallocation category for the UK leans towards a slight over estimation because one of the 
constituent processes of ‘misallocation’ referred to in the too much inance literature is the attraction of highly educated 
scientists, mathematicians, engineers into the inancial sector, when they might be more usefully employed in technology 
based, R&D intensive sectors that do most to boost the productivity of an economy (Arcand et al, 2015, Cecchetti and 
Kharroubi, 2015). In the UK case it could be asserted that because these individuals are attracted from a global labour 
pool, they do not deprive the UK economy of their skills. This assumes that the senior most skilled, and most highly 
trained people employed in the City are almost entirely foreign nationals. Some recent rudimentary Oice of National 
Statistics data (with no accompanying skill proile breakdown) reports that 59% of City workers were UK nationals in 
2016, and that igure has actually reduced in recent years https://news.cityolondon.gov.uk/record-number-of-european-
workers-in-the-city-of-london/. Ten years earlier towards the middle of the inancial crisis period and our time period 
the numbers were higher still. Recent CV analysis by the einancial careers website found that of staf working in mergers 
and acquisitions and investment banking in the City of London, 65% were UK nationals https://news.einancialcareers.
com/dk-en/231364/percentage-of-city-of-london-staf-from-the-eu. Even if the brain drain part of misallocation is a slight 
over-estimation, this is only one element of misallocation costs and when it comes to the headline igure we compensate 
be leaving out potential excess rent costs.   
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By aggregating both the too much inance misallocation costs, with our calculations for the 
costs of the inancial crisis and how it afected the path of GDP, we are efectively creating 
a further hypothetical growth path. This is what GDP would look like if there were both no 
inancial crisis and inance was an optimum size so that misallocation costs were avoided. 
This creates a new counterfactual top line path of GDP. The headline negative sum costs 
we present (misallocation + cost of crisis) is efectively arrived at by subtracting actual 
GDP in a given year from these new top line igures for each year. Figure 1 shows that 
the headline igure of £4,500 billion is the gap between lines A and C. Excess rent would 
constitute a separate additional category again on top of these negative sum costs.
Figure 1: The counterfactual pathways of ‘too much finance’
One question arising from our method is whether it risks double counting, by including 
some of the crisis costs in misallocation igures? We use lower bound misallocation 
estimations to try to avoid this, but research has already shown the misallocation data is 
robust even controlling for inancial crisis costs (Arcand el at, 2015). The data used in the 
too much inance literature under the misallocation category controls for business cycles 
associated with inancial crises. Moreover, additional research by one of the authors of 
this report has also shown that there are longer-run resource allocation costs associated 
with large active inancial sectors, which exist independently and on top of the costs 
of inancial crises (Sturn and Epstein, 2014.) Adding the two together, especially when 
conservative lower bound estimations are deployed, is therefore unlikely to produce 
double counting3. In short, we believe the igures we present and the methodology we 
deploy are conservative, and likely to underestimate the true macroeconomic costs 
associated with excess inance. 
3 Neither technically speaking is adding rent extraction costs to misallocation costs, double counting, because although 
they are related they are not the same thing. Rent extraction is zero sum, in that it measures how one group in society 
(retirees, pension, insurance, mortgage holders, or borrowers/ debtors) lose income through excess payments to 
another group (bankers, rentiers, traders). Misallocation results because of lost productivity, less employment and lower 
wages, resulting from inance taking labour that could be employed more efectively elsewhere, with all the lost growth 
and tax revenue implications that low from that. This is not the same thing as excess rent. Rather it is an additional cost 
of a macroeconomic nature, on top of any rent extraction.
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UK Misallocation Costs
The biggest cost we found in the UK case was misallocation. The too much inance 
literature uncovers an inverted u-shaped relationship between credit to the private 
sector and GDP growth (Arcand et al, 2015, Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012, 2015). This 
literature puts the threshold turning point where credit starts to impact negatively on 
growth at around 90-100 per cent GDP. In the UK, average credit to the private sector 
during 1995-2015, was 160 per cent of GDP. Such estimates can be used to construct a 
counterfactual path of growth, assuming credit was at an optimal growth maximising 
level. Dynamic growth costs are quite large using this method showing that cumulative 
GDP would have been around 14 percent higher with a leaner inancial system. Indeed, 
the cumulative price tag for the years 1995-2015 are in excess of £2.7 trillion or roughly 
1.5 times annual output (also see table 2). This is shown in igure 2 below. 
Figure 2: Too Much Finance 1995-2015 UK misallocation estimate
We build on Arcand et al (2012) and Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012), who investigate the 
relationship between the size of the inancial sector and economic growth. Both studies 
estimate regressions of the following form: 
Here g is the real growth rate of GDP per capita and C is the ratio of private credit to GDP 
and thus stands for the size of the inancial sector. The key result from both papers is 
that the coeicient ߚ1 is positive, indicating that an increase in inance is associated with 
faster growth, but that the coeicient ߚ2 is negative, indicating that inance becomes 
detrimental to growth after a certain point. There is such a thing as too much inance on 
the basis of this regression.
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To approximate the negative growth efect from having too much inance, we start by 
calculating the maximum growth rate that could be obtained, holding all else constant, 
where the inancial sector at its optimal size. This maximum growth rate can be obtained 
by plugging in the growth maximizing credit to GDP ratio, Cmax=−ߚ1/2ߚ2, into the 
regressionequation. We can then calculate the cost to growth from having an ineiciently 
large inancial system as the diference between the growth maximum and the average 
growth rate that results from the observed size of the inancial sector between 1995-2015. 
Table 3: Too Much Finance Co-efficients and Maximum Credit Threshold
The next step is to deine a counterfactual per capita growth rate: 
The counterfactual growth rate is the growth rate that would have prevailed if the 
inancial sector were not ineiciently large. Finally, to arrive at a counterfactual measure 
of GDP it is necessary to extrapolate a per capita income series beginning in 1990 using 
the counterfactual growth rate and then multiply by the population each year4.
Costs of Crisis
Where costs of the crisis for the UK are concerned, it could be claimed the crisis of 2008 
originated in the United States and was therefore not attributable to the UK inancial 
sector. However, London came to specialise in many of the securitization techniques and 
inancial innovations implicated in the 2008 crisis. For example, in the well documented 
case of America International Group (AIG), most problems were centred around AIG 
Financial Products, - the London arm of the insurance giant that took big positions in 
credit default swaps with little oversight. Moreover, London’s integration into world 
inancial circuits has meant the UK’s own vulnerability to crisis is in part a function of 
its integration into these global circuits of capital through the City of London. For these 
reasons, we maintain that cost of crisis calculations in the UK, are a relection of both 
the City’s prominent position in world markets and the vulnerabilities the rest of the UK 
economy has to inancial crises as a consequence. 
To put a price tag on the amount of lost output due to the crisis, we compare the path 
of real GDP to a simple no-crisis counterfactual where the UK continued to grow at its 
pre-crisis trend. Speciically, we consider the pre-crisis trend as the average growth rate 
for the period 1980-2007, which amounted to around 2.8 percent annually. This trend 
growth rate can then be used to construct a simple no-crisis counterfactual where the 
UK economy would have continued to grow at 2.8 percent per year after 2007. Had GDP 
continued to expand at its pre-crisis trend it would have reached around £2.1 trillion 
by the year 2015. This is about a 16 percent higher compared with the actual post-crisis 
4 Series for GDP, GDP per capita, and total population for the United Kingdom were obtained from the UK Data Service.
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path of GDP, which stood at £1.8 trillion in 2015. As above, we can also calculate the 
cumulative net present value of the output loss. This amounts to roughly £1.8 trillion, or 
approximately 100 percent of 2015 output. In igure 3, the blue zone represents this £1.8 
trillion5. 
Figure 3 Real versus Actual UK GDP
For the pre-crisis period 1980-2007, the following regression model was used.
Our estimates indicate that the trend real growth rate between 1980-2007 was around 
2.8 percent annually.
We then calculate the no crisis counterfactual as:
Where ܩDP2007 denotes the level of real GDP in 2007. This expression simply states that 
the counterfactual real GDP is equal to the level of GDP on the eve of the crisis times the 
cumulative counterfactual growth between 2007 and 2015.
5  This igure is an aggregate crisis cost. It could be argued that a true igure should exclude the costs of iscal consolidation, 
because this was a conscious choice made by UK politicians, and not an inevitable outcome of the crisis. However crises 
always involve choices that become part of and construct a crisis trajectory. Such choices relect the wider environment 
in which they are made and austerity in the UK became a function of and part of the crisis trajectory. Moreover, the data 
on costs of iscal consolidation is still emerging. Simon Wren Lewis’s latest estimates put the cumulative cost of iscal 
consolidation at 12.1% of UK GDP in 2015, or £228.5 billion. https://mainlymacro.blogspot.com/2018/03/the-economic-
and-political-cost-of-uk.html In short, the data indicates costs of crisis go far beyond austerity costs. We include them 
here as part of the UK’s crisis trajectory.
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Excess Rent
Our third category is excess rent. As table 2 shows the excess rent category for the 
UK has been divided into: i) an excess compensation category; and ii) an excess proit 
category. On average, those working in inance earn about 15% more than people with 
similar educational backgrounds in other sectors. However, this changed in the lead 
up to the inancial crisis, where the inance premium rose to above 20 percent in the 
year 2000 and subsequently reached 40 percent in 2005 (implying 40% of all inancial 
sector income immediately before the inancial was rent). Total excess compensation 
amounted to roughly £3 billion per year between 1985-1995. Total excess compensation 
subsequently increased markedly, peaking at around £22 billion in 2005, or 1.5 percent 
of GDP. Excess compensation appears to have fallen since the beginning of the global 
inancial crisis and remains at around £8 billion per year between 2010 and 2015. The 
chart for excess compensation in the UK looks as follows in igure 4.
Figure 4 Excess Compensation 1985-2015.
To calculate the amount of excess compensation in the UK inancial sector, we estimated 
a series of regressions using a large set of UK household surveys between 1970 and 
2015. In particular, we use several vintages of the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), the 
Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS), and the Annual Population Survey (APS). From these 
regressions we derived a igure of £280 billion. 
The excess proit data reported in table 2, involves inancial sector proits peaking at 
roughly £110 billion immediately before the global inancial crisis in 2007 and subsequently 
remaining between £60 and £70 billion. To put a total price tag on the amount of excess 
proits, we applied the lower bound 25% excess proits share suggested by Colangelo 
and Inklaar (2012), and compute the cumulative net present value. Carrying out this 
calculation for the 1995-2015 period, the total cost of the inancial sector embodied in 
excess proits amounts to roughly £400 billion in real terms, or around 22 percent of 
2015 GDP. Some of this will be a product of fees charged to foreign investors availing of 
City of London expertise. As explained earlier we discount the excess rent category from 
our headline igure, to err on the side of caution and forward what we consider to be a 
conservative total estimation of £4,500 billion.
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On the surface the total numbers for the UK are staggering. When we set out to replicate 
the earlier exercise undertaken for the United States for the UK we did not expect to 
see such a pronounced pattern. We should caution of course that any estimates of this 
nature will always be approximations. Other approaches could lead to diferent results. 
The estimates have however been carefully constructed, with caution. In this sense they 
do merit both further research and the start of a process of more carefully debating and 
considering the potential social and economic costs of excessive inance in the UK. 
In this respect, the numbers reported here should be of both of interest to researchers 
and a cause of concern for policy makers alike, but they also suggest a need to dig behind 
the numbers. First to further establish and test their veracity, and second to explain 
what might be causing any such efects, identifying the precise mechanisms at work. The 
‘inance curse’ concept is a framework that can inform and assist these research eforts. 
Unpacking UK Misallocation Costs
One particularly interesting trend revealed by the data is that misallocation costs are the 
biggest single contribution to UK costs at 147.4 per cent of 2015 GDP. The higher bound 
igure for misallocation for the United States is only 22 per cent of 2015 GDP. For the UK, 
misallocation accounts for between 52.1% and 60% of total UK costs, whereas for the US 
misallocation is only 17.48% and 20.5 % of total costs. 
The too much inance literature alerts us to a potential problem of macroeconomic 
underperformance and dysfunction, but has told us little about the contributions of 
precise mechanisms in particular countries. Cecchetti and Kharroubi’s study essentially 
considers two misallocation efects: the misallocation of skilled labour to the inancial 
sector, detrimentally impacting productivity levels, by disproportionately harming inance 
dependent R&D intensive industries; and inancial sector growth disproportionately 
beneitting high collateral, low productivity projects such as real estate and construction 
(Ceccheti and Kharroubi, 2015, p.3). The Arcand et al, study merely alludes to the fact 
that the inancial industry can misallocate resources even in good times, suggesting their 
results indicate this does occur because the costs they record are greater than simple 
inancial crisis costs (Arcand et al, 2015, p.23.) Consequently, the category of misallocation 
costs remains something of a black box. This second part of our report calls for a more 
thorough excavation of the black box of the misallocation category through more detailed 
UK country based research in response to the data presented in part one. 
The inance curse concept provides us with a potential framework or apparatus for 
further excavating the black box of misallocation. It identiies seven overlapping and 
mutually reinforcing processes that characterise inancial over dependence. These are: 
Dutch disease; brain drain; rent extraction and attraction; inancial volatility and crisis; 
uneven regional development; inequality and social segregation; political privilege and 
concentrations of power. The irst three combine to produce a net crowding out efect 
in which other sectors are depleted of resources and are potentially at the nub of the 
misallocation costs suggested by the UK data. 
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We suggest that three diferent dynamic efects might contribute to misallocation costs. 
1. Harmful financial agency – the intentional conscious decisions made by inancial 
actors about how to allocate their resources, relecting market incentives, that results 
in the selection of high collateral inancial assets (such as property, or liquid inancial 
instruments,) often contributing to price volatility, at the expense of longer term 
productive investments in technological and R&D intensive areas. Proportions of loans 
going to the UK manufacturing sector for example, have traditionally been low with one 
former IMF oicial estimating this to be as low as 1.4% in 2016 (Kaminska, 20166.) Such low 
igures potentially shed some light on why misallocation igures for the UK are so high. 
Establishing and interrogating such a pattern will require detailed investigations of the 
risk models of major inancial institutions, how this is afected by the regulatory and tax 
environment and how that in turn feeds into the investment decisions made, including 
proportions going to diferent sectors. It might also be illuminated by a survey of the 
attitudes of inanciers to diferent forms of risk and to diferent types of investment. 
A further efect or process is how inancial institutions demand returns (rent extraction) 
from irms whose core business is not inance, and the various time horizons this involves, 
including the extent to which it might restrict investment and expansion opportunities 
for the irms concerned. Both accounting practices and corporate law will shape these 
time horizons and the sets of incentives they involve. A deeper understanding of how 
inancial institutions and inancial risk models divert inancial resources away from high 
productivity projects will therefore require an inter-disciplinary efort. 
2 Structural gravitational forces - involving the pull that a buoyant growing inancial 
sector, with multiple asset and investment opportunities, (often unintentional) can 
exert within an economy by attracting both inancial and human capital away from 
other areas where it may be more proitably deployed (rent attraction and brain 
drain). This is efectively the suction, or vacuum cleaner efect identiied by the Bank of 
England’s chief economist (Haldane, 2012). Brain drain is a key element of the inance 
curse formulation and involves highly skilled workers, often with science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics backgrounds being attracted away from potentially more 
productive areas, into the dominant sector (inance) because of the lucrative inancial 
rewards and compensation available. The ‘too much inance’ literature has identiied this 
efect (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015, p.4, Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012, pp.1-2, Kneer, 
2013). However, aggregate econometric data tells us relatively little about the extent to 
which it is happening in particular locations, or the problems it may be producing in 
terms of labour and skill shortages in R&D intensive sectors. Uncovering this will require 
a more qualitative research efort involving CV analysis of samples of senior inancial 
sector employees, and the staing and personnel issues other sectors face. Where a 
pattern of brain drain can be identiied, we will also need to know more about why highly 
skilled individuals chose to enter inance rather than alternative industries. Programmes 
of qualitative interviewing may provide insights. 
6  Bank of England data puts this around 3.5% in 2018 https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/tables
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A further efect reported by Cecchetti and Kharroubi is that manufacturing sectors 
that are either R&D-intensive or dependent on external inance sufer disproportionate 
reductions in productivity growth during inancial booms. In such a scenario, rising 
inancial asset values and rising property prices, attract investment away from long-term 
productivity enhancing projects. Several factors could drive this: the ready availability of 
assorted inancial assets; cultural attitudes to property ownership and inancial risk; high 
numbers of inancial experts and advisors who ease the process of converting capital 
into holdings of inancial instruments and assets; the extent to which regulatory and tax 
provisions facilitate and encourage this. In short, further country level analysis needs to 
consider these broader range of factors.
3. Unintended distortionary price spillovers, - the incidental consequences of inancial 
inlows and the fees derived from handling inancial transactions, which spillover to inlate 
local prices most notably the exchange rate, but also property prices, making it harder for 
alternative tradable sectors and exporters to compete in world and local markets, often 
known as Dutch disease (Corden, 1984, Botta, 2015). The ‘too much inance’ literature 
makes no reference to this process but it is an integral part of the inance curse concept. 
In the UK case, while systematic research, or precisely estimated costs, have been lacking 
to date, a number of expert observers have identiied symptoms, where the ‘persistent 
overvaluation of sterling’, caused by the UK banking sector crowds out other sectors 
(Buiter, 2008). Ashoka Mody, formerly of the IMF’s European Department, identiied how 
the City’s unrivalled position as a inancial centre draws speculative lows from abroad, 
inlating sterling and allowing leverage by global banks in London, that beneits ‘a bank- 
property nexus,’ but leaves ‘the rest of the country to sufer’, including an under-funded 
manufacturing sector (Kaminska, 2016.) Paul Krugman, similarly claimed the City’s 
inancial exports crowded out manufacturing by keeping the currency strong, making 
the 16% depreciation in sterling since the Brexit referendum vote a necessary adjustment 
(Krugman, 2016). Unfortunately, other misallocation costs might mean the UK’s capacity 
to respond to the potential advantage of such an exchange rate adjustment, might be 
limited, due to depleted manufacturing capacity, a poor record on R&D, low levels of 
productivity, and depleted and distorted pools of skilled labour. Again further research 
into Dutch disease in the UK is required, including an econometric stream estimating total 
macroeconomic costs, but also a more qualitative stream considering the experiences 
of export businesses with the price constraints brought about by the exchange rate and 
high property prices and rents.
Investigating these three diferent processes potentially provides us with a much better 
sense of the sources of UK macroeconomic underperformance and will help to unpick 
the full scope and nature of the misallocation problem the UK faces, as suggested by 
the data presented in part 1 of this report. If these efects are found to be at work, the 
inance curse concept suggests a need to go much further through an interdisciplinary 
efort investigating how they afect the social fabric of the UK. This would include: how 
high level inancial rewards together with property investment and competition shape 
the built environment, community coniguration and life opportunities; what it means 
for disparities between regions and the causal mechanisms at work; political and policy 
mind-sets, including why politicians of major parties are so reluctant to consider how a 
large inancial sector can come with costs (Baker and Wigan, 2017, pp.199-200). 
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While further research is required, the evidence presented here indicates that the UK 
economy, may have performed much better in overall growth terms if: (a) its inancial 
sector was smaller; (b) if inance was more focused on supporting other areas of the 
economy, rather than trying to act as a source of wealth creation and extraction in its 
own right. The timing of these indings could not be more important. As the UK’s tortuous 
Brexit negotiations draw to a close, attention turns to what kind of economic model the 
UK will have in a post-Brexit world. If the UK has been sufering from a form of inance 
curse, and there is strong evidence that inancial crowding out and misallocation efects 
have been present, UK political parties and public authorities face a choice. They can try 
to maintain the role and pre-eminence of UK inancial services, promoting this sector and 
the City of London, at a time when exit from the European Union, will make maintaining 
the current status more di cult. Or they can try to take advantage of the opportunity of 
a permanently lower exchange rate by pursuing an alternative path. This would require 
more concerted eforts to identify, address and reduce the misallocation costs that the 
evidence presented here suggests are a particular UK problem. Certainly, the lower level 
of sterling provides some platform to reduce the UK record current account deicit. Any 
adjustment is unlikely to happen automatically through a market led process. A more 
proactive UK economic strategy will need to begin with an understanding of misallocation 
costs, how they arise and the ‘crowing out’ dynamics they entail. In turn, this will need 
to lead to a greater willingness to identify speculative short-term investments and 
processes of rent extraction that cause such efects, and to design regulation and public 
policy with an eye to discouraging and disincentivising such activity. At the very least the 
research and results reported here suggests a need to change the terms of the public 
conversation about inance in the UK. This will need to involve a more explicit recognition 
that where inance is concerned, more can sometimes be less, and less could be more. 
The data presented suggests that more careful consideration and debate of the potential 
social and economic costs of excessive inance in the UK, is long overdue. 
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